Act to Establish a Legal Framework for Information Technology Canlii

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Smith, A., “After officers tested Clearview AI, Calgary Police Improved Tracking System for New Technologies,” Calgary Herald, March 11, 2020; Carney, B., “Despite denials, the RCMP used the facial recognition program for 18 years,” The Tyee, March 10, 2020; “An application used by the police can identify people from a single photo,” Radio-Canada, January 20, 2020[ in French]; Péloquin, T., “Facial recognition: the SPVM refuses to say whether it uses controversial software,” La Presse, February 18, 2020 [in French]; Bronskill, J., “RCMP facing proposed class action over use of Clearview AI`s facial-recognition technology,” The Globe and Mail, July 13, 2020; Documents provided by Clearview. 13 See ARPPIPS québec, loc. cit. 10, p. 1. 1: “Sections II and III of this Act do not apply to personal data that are public by law. The Registrar, a public official whose functions are established under ALPE3, ensures that corporations incorporated and/or operating in Québec are properly registered and makes public the information he collects by publishing it in the Register.4 The applicant, OpenCorporates, is a United Kingdom-based publisher of one of the largest publicly available databases and provides access to reliable data on: Companies operating in approximately 130 jurisdictions. including Quebec.5 From 2012 to 2016, OpenCorporates collected information from the registry through various automated data retrieval processes and aggregated this information into its own database. However, in March 2016, in an effort to limit these types of practices, the Registrar amended the terms of use of its website to prohibit the compilation and dissemination of registry data, thereby contractually preventing OpenCorporates from continuing to collect information from the registry. However, the Registrar`s efforts to protect registry data did not stop there; In November 2016, it sent a letter of formal notice to OpenCorporates asking the data publisher to delete the information it had already collected before the amended terms of use – a request the applicant claims was made without legal permission. “Although the Regulations and their exceptions are ambiguous and require an interpretive practice, they must be interpreted in accordance with the Canadian Charter. Restricting the free flow of publicly available information violates the constitutional protection of freedom of expression. For this reason, exceptions to this principle must be interpreted restrictively and a broad interpretation of the freedom available to the public must be preferred so as not to unduly restrict freedom of expression. » Cookies are disabled for this browser.

Wiley Online Library requires cookies for authentication and use of other features of the Website; Therefore, cookies must be enabled to navigate the website. Detailed information on how Wiley uses cookies can be found in our Privacy Policy. 7 The Registrar was required by law to establish a legal framework for information technology in order to limit the search functions of the register to the purpose for which the register was created, namely to enable the public to find information about a company as opposed to an individual. See generally ibid., paragraphs 72 to 80. the positive effects of personal data protection do not outweigh the negative impact on Clearview`s freedom of expression. There are no urgent and material concerns that could justify a violation of freedom of expression, as there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in images that individuals themselves have already made public or that have been allowed to be published. In addition, the offices noted that Clearview has collected, used and disclosed the personal information of individuals in Canada for inappropriate purposes that cannot be made appropriate by consent. We found that Clearview`s massive collection of images and the creation of biometric facial recognition boards for the stated purpose of providing a service to law enforcement personnel and using it by others through test accounts constitutes mass identification and surveillance of individuals by a private entity in the course of its activities. We have considered Clearview`s purposes to be inappropriate if: (i) have nothing to do with the purposes for which these images were originally published; (ii) are often to the detriment of the person whose images are taken; and (iii) create a risk of significant harm to these individuals, the vast majority of whom have never been and will never be involved in a crime. In addition, it incorrectly collected images through random scratching of publicly available websites. “Toronto Police Admit to Using Secret Facial Recognition Technology Clearview AI,” CBC, February 13, 2020; Gillis, W., Allen, K., “Peel and Halton police reveal they also used a controversial facial recognition tool,” The Star, February 14, 2020.

Therefore, personal data located on public blogs, public social media or other public websites will be included in the “publicly available” exception because it is included in the definition of a publication. Therefore, the collection of this information does not require consent. Question 2: Did Clearview collect, use or disclose personal information for a reasonable purpose? 12 See Insurance Institute of Canada v. Guay, [1998] CAI 431. See also Insurance Institute of Canada v. Guay, 1997 CanLII 6532 (QC CQ). Outside quebec, it was determined that PIPEDA could turn to an organization established outside Canada that carries out a commercial activity with a real and significant connection to Canada. See Lawson v. Accusearch Inc., 2007 FC 125; AM Globe24h.com. 2017 FC 114. “Given the significant potential benefits of Clearview`s law enforcement and national security services, on the one hand, and the fact that significant harm is unlikely, on the other, especially considering that the stored information is already publicly available and distributed to law enforcement for legitimate investigative purposes only, Clearview`s objectives are quite reasonable. Always, sometimes or never? Screening of Personal and Client Information, ICDO BC, 2018.