Courts that are particularly concerned that small estimates of the likelihood of compliance may create an undesirable sense of security and cause a jury to ignore other evidence should implement procedures to reduce this risk. The party presenting the evidence has the primary responsibility for informing the jury of the evidence, but the legal system also depends on cross-examination, opposing witnesses, and court orders to direct the jury. The effectiveness of the first two approaches depends on the counterparty`s ability to seek the assistance of a competent lawyer and a qualified expert. Issues related to retention and appointment of experts have been discussed earlier in this chapter. The third approach – jury trial – allows the court to directly address issues that could cause confusion or overweight. Juries generally receive instructions from the court on the factors to be considered when assessing the credibility of witnesses. For example, Caljic No. 2.20 (3rd ed. 1970), quoted approvingly in People v Hall, 28 Cal.3d 143, 167 Cal. Rptr.
844, 616 P.2d 826 (1980). Similarly, courts could lecture a jury, for example, on the factors that affect the appropriateness of DNA analysis and the need to consider all the evidence in the case. The question arises as to whether the statistics of the aptitude tests themselves arise. The 1992 NRC report noted that the probative value of such statistics, when compared to their potential to mislead a jury, promotes eligibility: “Laboratory failure rates must be continuously estimated in blind performance tests and disclosed to the jury” (p. 89). Since the purpose of our report is to determine which aspects of the procedures used in the context of forensic DNA testing are scientifically valid, we do not attempt such a political assessment. This chapter describes some of the legal principles and procedures governing the admission and use of DNA evidence in the courtroom, and how this evidence has been obtained over the past decade. In assimilating scientific developments, the legal system necessarily lags behind the scientific world. Before using evidence derived from scientific progress, courts must consider the proposed statement to determine whether it is suitable for trial, and controversies within the scientific community are often seen as grounds for excluding scientific evidence. While some controversies that have been concluded in the scientific literature continue to limit the presentation of DNA evidence in some jurisdictions, courts are making greater use of ongoing research on population genetics of DNA profiles.
We hope that our review of the research will contribute to this process. (a) In accordance with the right to privacy and due process, DNA evidence should be collected, preserved, tested and used where it may support the establishment of guilt or innocence. The disclosure rules determine the circumstances in which a defendant may require the production of such documents. Given that many complex technical, scientific and statistical issues affect the use of DNA evidence, there will be instances where defendants will argue that without complete and detailed information, they will not be able to adequately prepare for trial.4 While some courts have ordered liberal disclosure, access to documents and information would broaden the scope of discovery in some jurisdictions. While some courts have required liberal disclosure of DNA tests,5 others have taken a more restrictive approach. 6 In jurisdictions that interpret their detection rules as applying only to written reports, the defence cannot obtain disclosure of laboratory records if the DNA examiner does not provide a written report or include a question in a report, even if the investigator makes an oral report.7 Our recommendation that all aspects of DNA testing be fully documented, is especially useful when this documentation can be found before the process. Expressing opinions on uniqueness would simplify the presentation of evidence by removing accurate estimates of population frequency or probability. However, if the basis of an opinion were attacked for statistical reasons or if estimates of frequency or probability were allowed, this advantage would be lost. However, because the difference between an extremely low probability and an opinion on uniqueness is so small, courts that rule on a uniqueness test and conclude that the test is met may decide to allow the test with or in place of the former if the scientific evidence supports such a claim. In federal courts, Rule 16 (a) (l) (C) of the Federal Code of Criminal Procedure, which permits inspection of physical items in State possession at the request of the defendant, has been interpreted as prescribing the right of a defendant to test or retest a sample under government control. See, for example, United States v Butler, 988 F.2d 537 (5th Cir.
1993) (cocaine), cert. denied, 114 p.ct. 413 (1993). Similarly, some States interpret the rules of application of the law of their jurisdiction as requiring review (Note 1984). Other states have laws or regulations that specifically provide for the review of physical evidence. See, for example, Iowa Code Ann. § 813.2, R. 13(2)(b)(1) (1979); The. Crim code.
Part 71 (West 1981); State v Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 427 (Minn. 1989) (citing a Minnesota Code of Criminal Procedure, which grants defense attorney the right to “all results of. scientific tests, experiments or comparisons related to the particular case” to conclude that, to the extent possible, “an accused should receive the actual DNA sample(s) to reproduce the tests”). In addition, some authorities support a constitutional right to review arising from the requirement of due process. See, for example, Moore v State, 748 P.2d 732, 735 (Ok. Crim. App. 1987) (The Oklahoma Constitution requires the state to give the defendant an opportunity to re-examine and retest them, unless the sample was consumed by government authorities; illegal substance); State v. Thomas, 421 S.E.2d 227, 234 (W.Va. 1992) (if the prosecution conducts a test, such as an electrophoretic blood test, that consumes the sample to be analyzed, the state must “keep as much record of the test as reasonably possible to enable a defendant and his experts to fully and fairly examine the results”). Other dishes, though.
concluded that, even if a new hearing was denied, the right to cross-examine the prosecutor`s expert provided the accused with sufficient protection. See, for example, Frias/State, 547 N.E.2d 809, 813 (Ind. 1989) (cocaine), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 921 (1990); People v. Bell, 253 N.W.2d 726.729 (1977); Montoya (1995). (iii) if the person submits the statement, a hearing should be held to determine whether the person has met the requirements of paragraph (a) of this standard and if it is determined that the requirements of paragraph (a) of this standard are met, the request for review or reconsideration should be granted; In the short term, jury should be made aware of both the value of statistical evidence and its limitations. In the longer term, research should be conducted to assess the impact of DNA testimony on jury decision-making and the impact of other approaches, such as likelihood ratios or instructions in the application of the Bayesian theorem, on jury understanding. Studies are needed to test reactions to the type of DNA evidence presented in the courtroom, as well as witness statements, lawyers` arguments, and court orders. Assumptions such as the suggestion that jurors faced with estimated laboratory error rates and random probability could use both on average (Lempert, 1993) or that jurors will not use information on laboratory error rates cannot be meaningfully assessed if jurors do not receive the kind of support they would receive in the relevant legal environment. Further research into jury responses should test the capacity of jury instructions, videotaped expert statements, and other educational efforts to facilitate the proper interpretation of DNA evidence. While the numbers were presented as an estimate of the frequency of a profile or the probability of a random match, and were not mislabeled as the probability that the defendant was not the source of the incriminating DNA, the argument that the numbers will overwhelm the jury rarely prevailed.88 Only one jurisdiction regularly made quantitative statements about the probability or frequency of the population in Criminal Cases Excluded by fear of unduly influencing lay jurors.
89 and the Supreme Court of that state issued an exception to the exclusion rule for the calculation of maximum frequency levels of DNA profiling (State v Bloom, 516 N.W.2d 159 [Minn.