15AB. Use of extrinsic material in the interpretation of a statute……………………… 24 (5) Where an Act confers the power to issue, grant or issue an instrument (including regulations, orders or Acts) that prescribes penalties of up to a certain amount or imprisonment for a specified period, such limitation on the penalties that may be imposed does not prevent the instrument from requiring the production of an affidavit. Thus, when I reflect on Professor Raymond`s request above[51] that judges and other decision-makers should honestly disclose the considerations (including policy considerations) they take into account when preferring one interpretation of the law over another, can I be accused of hiding or obscuring all the important considerations that played a role in my thinking in Carr? I don`t think so. Did I resort to a purely verbal or linguistic explanation of my interpretation preference in order to avoid the accusations of formalists that I exceeded the bounds of judicial legitimacy or allowed agreeable political considerations to influence my decision instead of “sticking to the text”? Certainly not. On the other hand, have I fallen into the trap of indulging in amateur psychology while sifting through the crevices of my mind and memory to explain the factors that led me to my decision? In short, in explaining my dissenting opinion in Carr, have I given reasons that adequately reflect the judicial obligation to explain a dissenting opinion on the meaning of the legislation in question? For example, if Today FM`s interpretation were accepted, His Honours argued that the ACMA would also be prevented from taking action against a broadcaster who had contravened paragraph Cl(1)(a) by advertising tobacco, as such conduct was also an offence under the Tobacco Advertising Products Act 1992 (Cth). The ACMA would therefore have to wait until the broadcaster has been convicted under this law. [88] Review more difficult cases and, if something is unclear, recognize it when applying the law. If the problem is important to resolve it conclusively, you should seek professional legal advice. It is impossible to formulate rules that should be so clear in all situations that unnecessary judicial selection follows from possible meanings. Questions of interpretation sometimes arise not from the ambiguity of the language, but rather from the fact that the judge must apply to the situation a general situation that could not have been foreseen by Parliament. Of course, the task of the judge to essentially fulfill the legislative will to apply it to a particular situation is absolutely necessary to make the laws applicable.
As we all know, in many cases legislation must be expressed in general and more or less abstract terms. A detailed description of certain prohibited or permitted human acts and their consequences would be an impossible task. It is now an important rule of legal interpretation that it is assumed that an interpretation that suspends or restricts fundamental rights or freedoms was not intended if the intention is not expressed in unambiguous and unambiguous language. The rule, known as the “principle of legality”, has been described as requiring that “constructive decisions” require that laws be interpreted in such a way as to “avoid or minimise interference with common law rights and freedoms”.18 As regards the application of paragraph 6, the applicants sought to invoke the principle of legality on the basis of its presentation in X7 v Australian Crime Commission (`Australian`). Crime Commission”). X7). [37] However, Their honours distinguished the application of X7 in that the decision in X7 depended on the circumstances in which the person forcibly examined under the relevant legislation had been charged with a criminal offence and was already “the subject of prosecution”. [38] Your Honours noted that X7 stated that the defendant`s defence would inevitably be compromised if he were to submit to such an inquiry, and that the legislation in question was not intended to make such a change to the criminal process.
The Court rejected Tabcorp`s argument that Article 4.3.12 concerned the principle of legality, which requires “that plain language be used in legislation when it deprives a person of a valuable right.” [65] It was noted that Tabcorp`s assertion “does not address the conditional nature – as opposed to the vested nature – of the right to final payment”; That right would arise only if new licences were issued. In essence, it was decided that “the `right to payment` has not been withdrawn. The event that triggered it just didn`t happen. [66] 11A…. Insertion of definitions in provisions or insertion of entries in lists or tables 21 The task of the judge in interpreting legislative, constitutional or subordinate provisions is in principle a textual task. It is unacceptable to deviate too far from the text by importing contextual and political considerations. The text is the anchor of the judicial task, as it is for the task of any lawyer or citizen responsible for the interpretation and application of legislation. [52] Obedience to the text has a constitutional basis. It is based on the respect required of the courts for the democratic nature of the parliamentary legislature by addressing the courts in terms formally adopted by Parliament.
Pay particular attention to terms defined in by-laws (usually in an appendix called a “dictionary” or “definitions”). Some common terms are also defined in the Statutory Interpretation Act (ATIA) for each jurisdiction. For example, in each jurisdiction, the AEOI defines “person” to include corporations and governments. 1. This approach is reflected in both the common law of statutory interpretation and section 15AA of the Act Interpretation Act, 1901 (Cth). 2. See, for example, CIC Insurance Ltd v. Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384, p.
408; Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, at 384. 3. SZTAL v. Minister of Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362, p. 368. 4. R v. A2 [2019] HCA 35, at [124]. 5.
See, for example, R/A2 [2019] HCA 35, p. [32], [124], [163]. 6. See, for example, Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27, pp. 46-47. 7. Deal against Father Pius Kodakkathanath (2016) 258 CLR 281, at 295. 8. “It is not a question of attributing a collective state of mind to the legislator. That would be a misleading use of metaphors.
(Zheng V Cai (2009) 239 CLR 446, p. 455). 9. Certain Lloyd`s Underwriters v. Cross (2012) 248 CLR 378, p. 389. 10. Zheng V Cai (2009) 239 CLR 446, p.
455. 11. SAS Trustee Corporation v. Miles (2018) 265 CLR 137, p. 157. 12. Project Blue Sky Inc v. Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, pp. 381-382. 13. Ibid. 14.
See, for example, Independent Commission Against Corruption v Cunneen (2015) 256 CLR 1. 15. Section 15AB(2)(b) and (c) of the Interpretation Act, 1901 (Cth). 16. Section 15AB(f) and (h) of the Act Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth).