It clarified the case-law in the context of the repeal of general administrative acts, according to which that legal figure produces effects for the future and cannot therefore in itself re-establish the legal order which can be broken by the application of the repealed provision, but merely terminates its validity without affecting the presumption of legality inherent in the administrative act and which is lost only by judicial annulment. in the context of a final judgment examining the factual and legal circumstances in force at the time of the adoption of that act. The Plenary Chamber of Administrative Disputes of the Council of State recalled that the constitutional and legal controls carried out by this company and the Constitutional Court on the basis of the norms adopted in the state of emergency are autonomous and independent. Decrees the provisional suspension of the effects of Decree 555, which adopts the general revision of the spatial plan of Bogotá D.C., since the analysis in question shows a violation of the provisions referred to in the application that support the security letter, which, at this stage of the procedure, leads to the configuration of an appearance of illegality consisting of: whereas, of course, the Mayor of Bogotá D.C., she was not authorized to revise and adapt the Spatial Plan of Bogotá D.C. because of the extraordinary power conferred on her by Article 12 of Law 810 of 2003, during the period of 90 calendar days so that the Council of Bogotá would no longer be informed of the matter, had not yet expired. Competence conferred in the same regulations for the development of the faculty provided for in Article 313 (7) of the Political Constitution. Therefore, despite the fact that the Court declares the legislative decrees inapplicable, the Council retains its competence to review the legality of administrative acts resulting from the state of emergency. Law 1437 of 2011 “Adoption of the Rules of Procedure and Administrative Disputes” provides: “Article 136. On the other hand, it declares the irrefutable paragraph 2, article 245 of Law 906 of 2004, with the exception of the expression within thirty-six (36) hours following the completion of the respective examination, which has been declared inapplicable, provided that the verification of legality, which corresponds to the judge of guarantees, it must be done in advance. On the basis of those arguments, the Council examined the legality of Resolutions 1035 and 1036 of the Ministry of Social Protection, which governed Legislative Decree 132 of 2010. This research deals with the specificities of the control of the legality of banking regulatory decisions within the framework of the current system of financial supervision from the point of view of Spanish and European administrative law. In particular, the situations arising from the reform carried out in the European Union over the last decade in order to establish the legislator in accordance with Articles 15, 28 and 250.2 Superior were required to introduce rapid and effective judicial review of the investigative acts carried out by the Public Prosecutor`s Office in relation to the extinguishment of property. Because of its characteristics of accessibility, efficiency, adequacy and its nature as an essential element of the review of diffuse constitutionality in Colombia, only a subsequent formal and substantive judicial review carried out within thirty-six (36) hours of the implementation of the measure of interference with the fundamental right would be in conformity with the Constitution.
IMMEDIATE CONTROL OF LEGALITY / COMPETENCE / COMPETENCE OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE – For the exercise of immediate control of legality / PROCEDURES BEFORE THE COUNCIL OF STATE / COMPETENCE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE / SPECIAL CHAMBER OF TRANSITIONAL DECISION TO THE COUNCIL OF STATE / SPECIAL DECISION CHAMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE / FUNCTIONS OF THE SPECIAL DECISION CHAMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE. The only legal effect resulting from the unconstitutionality is the loss of the applicability of the administrative act, but not its illegality as a result, the chamber recalled. Consequently, the inapplicability which the Court of Justice rules on legislative decrees has no bearing on the Council`s decision on the legality of the administrative acts resulting therefrom. Although Decree 132 was declared unenforceable by the Court, the Council declared the resolutions legal. The Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Council of Justice confirms the decision of the body since Dr. JANETH PATRICIA ORTEGA FRAGOSO since the possession and exercise of the functions of first municipal criminal judge of Garzón Huila since July 6, 1999 and until July 27. on the basis of the appointment by the Court of the Judicial District of Neiva for a period of 22 calendar days In place of the incumbent, who was on vacation, she took office at the same time on 24 July 1999 and began to serve as Director of the Municipal Judiciary of Plata Huila, posts for which she also received the salary corresponding to the name of the State Treasury. Procedure prohibited to civil servants by article 128 of the Political Constitution, which stipulates that “no one may simultaneously perform more than one public mission or receive more than one mandate from the Treasury or from companies or institutions in which the State has a majority, except in cases expressly established by law, “says the Chamber, which was the result of negligence, negligence or negligence of the former judicial officer who should and could have overcome it, because it was not the first time, as she claims, that she acted as a competent judge, that is why her act is to the degree of guilt, while the process of accusation of breach of duty of care that was necessary, to avoid the production of the typical result of their behavior. The Disciplinary Jurisdiction Chamber of the Supreme Council of Justice decides, Dr. MARIO ADAN CORREA BARRERA, in his capacity as fourth Deputy Prosecutor before the Supreme Court of Cartagena with a fine of 20 days` salary accumulated during the year 1999, responsible for the disciplinary offence under Article 196 of Law 734 of 2002 -38 of Law 200 of 1995-, for having obtained the prohibition provided for in Article 154, paragraph 3, of Act No. 270 of 1996, in accordance with art. 178 P.C.