The answers to questions of fact are determined by a trier of fact, such as a jury or judge. In many jurisdictions, such as England and Wales, appellate courts generally do not consider remedies based on errors of fact (errors in the answer to a question of fact). On the contrary, the findings of fact of the first place of jurisdiction are generally the subject of considerable attention on the part of the courts of appeal. [3] The existence of a “question of substantive law” is an essential condition for an appeal to the High Court. The following questions may constitute a “substantive question of law”: In the applicants` case, the First Court of Appeal had ordered that the question of the jurisdiction of the civil court be decided first, but that the appeal be decided without addressing the issue, thereby seriously affecting the applicants` rights. Similarly, no decision had been taken on the application under Rule 27 of the XLI Code, which affected their rights. Delhi High Court: A Divisional Bench by S. Muralidhar and Talwant Singh, JJ. dismissed an appeal by the Finanzamt against the decision of the Income Tax Appeal Tribunal (ITAT) on the ground that no substantive point of law had arisen. In order to explain the scope of Article 100 CCP, the court stated that a second appeal or, in this regard, an appeal is not a question of law. The right of appeal is enshrined in law.
A second appeal concerns only a question of law on the merits. If the law provides for a limited right of appeal, the Court cannot extend the scope of the appeal. Nor could the High Court allow a second appeal without discussing the question of law, the Supreme Court noted in the case. Civil Appeal No. 2843-2844 of 2010 entitled Nazir Mohamed Versus J. Kamala & Ors. The appeals are directed against a joint judgment and an order of 06.11.2008 rejecting the second appeal S.A. (MD) no. 64 of 2000 filed by the applicant, but the second appeal as S.A.
(MD) no. 558 of 2000, filed by the defendant, and setting aside the judgment and judgment of 17.09.1999 of the First Court of Appeal in case A.S. no. 16/1998, in so far as the first court of appeal had rejected the defendant`s right to a decision on the recovery of possession of the premises of the action. The High Court held that the defendant, as plaintiff in the application, was entitled to a declaration of ownership of half of the premises of the application, recovery of possession of that half of the premises of the action and recovery of income from that half of the plaintiff`s property belonging to the defendant and/or user fees. Enjoyment and/or use thereof. Article 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1908, which provides for a second appeal, as amended by Act No. 104 of 1976 amending the Code of Civil Procedure, with effect from 1.2.1977, reads as follows: 100. Second appeal: The court relied on the decision in Pankajakshi v. Chandrika, (2016) 6 SCC 157, which concluded that the provisions of the Punjab Courts Act 1918 allowing for the filing of regular second appeals were effective despite the restrictive conditions subsequently introduced by the amendment of Article 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure in 1976. Consequently, the requirement to raise a question of law on the merits was no longer a sine qua non condition for that court to rule on a second ordinary appeal. The responsibility of the court is essentially to provide answers to all questions asked in the courtroom.
To find the answer, there are two possibilities. One is about laws and the second is about facts. The answers that come from the aid of the law are called the question of law, and the answers that come from the facts are called the question of fact. “Any statement made by Talaq by a Muslim husband about his wife by word, whether oral or written, electronic or otherwise, is null and void.” Article 2(c) defines talaq as “talaq-e-biddat or any other similar form of talaq having the effect of an immediate and irrevocable divorce pronounced by a Muslim husband.” An essential question of fact and law was considered to have arisen in the present case. The court found that the defendant-plaintiff had no reason to use the disputed territory to enter and exit because of a right of servitude or even by way of “easement”. There was no indication that the side door of the respondent`s house was constructed with the consent of the municipal administration. Accept – reject the comparable – When can it be a “material legal question”? In this case, the respondent brought an action before the trial court for the removal of the temporary sheet metal sheds and other obstacles allegedly erected by the applicant (defendant in the action) on land that was a large public lot on the west side of the appellant`s house. The disputed property was located in an area called Madhu Colony, which was separate from the Sharma settlement where the defendant and plaintiff`s house was located. The obstructions on this property caused a barrier to entry and exit from the house by the defendant (plaintiff in the claim). The trial court granted the defendant an interim injunction. The applicant challenged that decision before the District Court, who dismissed his appeal. Subsequently, the present appeal was brought and decided in 2010 by a coordinated chamber of that court, concluding that the plaintiff-defendant did not have the right to enter and leave his home by the disputed road, so that the conclusion of the lower courts was set aside in that regard.
However, the judgment of subsequent courts, by which the plaintiff-defendant was ordered to eliminate interference on the disputed road, was upheld. The defendant, aggrieved by this decision, filed an application for special leave (SLP) with the Supreme Court and the case was referred back to that court, which was ordered to consider whether a substantive question of law was raised in the second appeal and then to retry the parties. In a landmark decision by Softbrands India Pvt Ltd[1], the Karnataka High Court ruled that the Indian Tax Court is the final investigatory authority; therefore, the issue of comparable selection, application of filters, etc. cannot raise a “substantive question of law” justifying the upholding of an appeal to the High Court, unless “perversity” is demonstrated ex facie in the Tribunal`s ex facie order. The Karnataka Supreme Court has noted that the overall implementation of transfer pricing adjustments based on comparability analysis is a matter of estimation. The General Court, as the final factual authority, decides on transfer pricing issues on the basis of the relevant documents and facts submitted. In this context, the Court held that the taxpayer must demonstrate “perversity” in the Tribunal`s findings to raise a “substantive question of law”. Under section 206A of the Income Tax Tax Act 1961 (`the Act`), an appeal against an order of the Tax Tribunal may be made to the High Court only if the High Court is satisfied that the case concerns a `substantive question of law`. [2] The Court may also formulate other “substantive points of law” at a later stage in the case of these “essential points of law”. Supreme Court: Justices L.
Nageswara Rao, Hemant Gupta* and Ajay Rastogi, composed of 3 members, held that the High Court is not bound to make substantive points of law unless it finds an error in the findings of the First Court of Appeal. A second appeal or appeal is not a legal remedy. The right of appeal is enshrined in law. A second appeal concerns only a question of law on the merits. If the law provides for a limited right of appeal, the Court cannot extend the scope of the appeal. The plaintiff defendant was not free to restate the facts or apply to the High Court for reconsideration or re-evaluation of the evidence on a second appeal. Article 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1908, as amended, limits the right of appeal to cases involving a substantive question of law. The existence of a question of law on the merits is the sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 100 of the 1908 Code of Civil Procedure.
In view of the key points of law raised in the present case, the Chamber, composed of Judges Navin Sinha and Indira Banerjee, stated: With all due respect to the High Court, neither of the two questions raised by the High Court is a question of law, let alone a question of substantive law. There was no controversy before the High Court as to the interpretation or legal effect of a document or as to an erroneous application of a rule of law in the interpretation of a document or otherwise which might have raised a question of law. There was no contentious issue before the High Court which was not covered by established principles of law and/or precedent. The Court added that, in order to be well-founded, a question of law must be challenged, which was not previously governed by the law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a significant influence on the outcome of the dispute and/or the rights of the parties when it receives a two-way answer.